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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, 
a corporation. 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
EUGENIA R. HUNT, FRED T. 
AOKI, and KYIOKO AOKI, his 
wife; NOBURO AOKI and EVA 
T. AOKI, his wife, and the ALTA 
REALTY AND CONSTRUC-
TION COMPANY. 
Defendants. 
Case 
No. 8953 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Statement of Case 
Appellant is appealling from an Interpleader Action, 
Wherein a judgment was entered by the trail court, in 
favor of all defendants other than defendant, Eugenia 
R. Hunt, granting specific performance of a Uniform 
Real Estate contract, and the execution of an escrow in 
connection therewith. 
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Appellant was the owner of a fourplex located at 
453 East 8th South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and on the 
1st day of June, 1957, listed said property for sale with 
Alta Realty and Construction Co., through one of their 
agents, Florence 0. Young, a licensed real estate sales-
lady. The listing was made on a sales agency contract for 
apartment listings (Exhibit 13 "D") a forn1 approved 
hy the Utah State Securities Commission for use by the 
Salt Lake Real Estate Board and Multiple Listing Bu-
reau, of which Alta Realty and Construction Company 
is a n1ember. Said listing offered said property for sale at 
a purchase price of $38,000.00, and also provided that 
appellant would consider as downpayment a small home 
with an apartment or a small duplex. 
Alta Realty and Construction Company found a 
buyer ready, willing and able to pay the purchase price, 
provided the appellant would take as a down payment a 
converted duplex located at 1027 East 2nd South Street 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, as per the listing agreement, 
tlw same being owned by Fred T. Aoki and Kiyoko 
.June Aoki, his wife, respondents herein. Said property 
was burdened hy a mortgage of $2,000.00 at that time. 
Appellant objected to the property having a mortgage on 
it, so respondents paid it off. See the uncontroverted 
testi1nony of Florence 0. Young, Agent of Alta Realty, 
(TR 7fi) while being cross exa1nined as a hostile w-itness. 
A. "1\lr~. Hunt would not take the deal unless 
that property was c.Ieared. It had a $2,000.00 
mortgage on it and the Aoki's rleared that 
off.'' 
And again ( TR 84). 
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Q. '"l\Irs. Young, you stated under questioning 
that Mrs. I-Iunt would not accept the property 
because it wasn't clear." 
A. "That is right." 
Q. "And in order to make it clear you stated the 
Aoki's went down and paid it off." 
A. "Uh, huh, it was a $2,000.00 mortgage." 
Appellant had also objected to the property being 
vacant and didn't want to be bothered trying to keep it 
rented. It had been suggested to appellant that the pro-
perty be sold on contract and appellant hold the contract, 
or resell it for cash. Appellant was agreeable to the 
suggestion, and required that the property be sold ~and 
she to be furnished the contract. See the uncontroverted 
testimony of Florence 0. Young, agent of Alta Realty, 
relating to the duplex being sold an contract, while being 
cross-examined as a hostile witness (TR 85). 
Q. "It was sold on contract 1" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "At whose request was it sold~" 
A. "Mrs. Hunts." 
Q. "Now, would you state why :Mrs. Hunt wanted 
that sold." 
A. "Because she wanted the property cleared.'' 
Q. "Would you state again why Mrs. Hunt 
wanted you to have the property sold hefore 
it would be acceptable to her as a trade." 
A. "She would accept a real estate contract, but 
not the property." 
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Said duplex property was sold for $10,500.00 with 
$1,000.00 down, to a Wanda Nelson, on a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract (Exhibt 4). 
Now that the mortgage of $2,000.00 had been paid 
and the property sold on contract, the requirements of 
appellant had been met, and an Exchange Agreement 
(Exhibit 1 P) was prepared. An Exchange Agreement 
is also a fonn approved by the rtah State Securities 
Cmn1nission for use of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board, 
and l\lultiple Listings Bureau, and is a preliminary 
contract to the final contract of sale where exchanges 
of property are Inade, just the same as an Earnest ~loney 
Agree1~1ent is a preliminary contract to the final contract 
of sale when any home is bought or sold. Knowing that 
should appellant wish to convert her contract on the 
Second South property to cash, it would be necessary 
that it be discounted, and to give added protection to 
appellant, Alta Realty required the Aokis' to purchase 
appellant's property for $39,500.00. This ''Tould allow 
appellant to sell the $10,500.00 contract, (having an un- · 
paid balance of $9,500 .00) for $8,000.00 cash, and still not 
realize less than $38,000.00, the sun1 for which said pro-
perty was listed. The exchange agreement was executed 
h~· the appellants and respondents~ and under the author-
ity therein, Alta Realty delivered srune to the Security 
Title Cmnpan~·. together with the abstracts on both 
properties, with a request that the abstracts be brought 
to date and the final papers prepared and the transaction 
be closed. See thP testiinony of Iferbert H. Halliday, 
Attorney at Law and manager of the Security Title Com-
pany, Sugarhouse Branch (TR 4 & 5). 
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Q. ''Would vou state to the Court when you first 
became ~cquainted with the parties respecting 
this transaction." 
A. "Well, it was during the month of August. 
Alta Realty Cmnpany brought me in an Ex-
change Agreement and an Earnest Money 
Agreement and requested that we continue 
the abstracts on both pieces of property con-
cerned and prepare the closing papers." 
See the further testimony of Herbert H. Halliday 
(TR 6). 
A. "Well, upon receipt of these, of the Exchange 
Agreement and the Earnest Money Agree-
ment, we obtained abstracts on both pieces 
of property and they were continued to date. 
Then contracts were prepared .and individual 
buyers and sellers escrow statements were 
prepared based upon the facts contained in 
1Vv( ({{tf 
the Exchange Agreement and the Earnest 
Money in preparation for closing the transac-
tions between the parties.'' 
After the necessary documents were prepared and 
abstracting completed, a closing date was set for on or ,-./fkL'i /,._. 
·-) appo-intmef!t;and 88tigltt emJPSsl ieftt.same say7 ~ //:, 
appointment, and sough counsel that same day, and em-
ployed one, Dean Sheffield, Attorney at Law, as counsel. 
The respondents herein then sought and employed present 
respondent counsel. 
Appellant counsel, Dean Sheffield and present re-
spondent counsel met to discuss and clarify any problems 
connected with this transaction. Mr. Sheffield raised 
three objections. 
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1. He had not had time to check the credit of Wanda 
Nelson, Contract buyer of the duplex. 
2. He had not met or been able to talk to Wanda 
Nelson. 
3. The exchange agreement was signed by Fred 
Aoki and his wife, and the Real Estate contract was run-
ning to Nobuo Aoki and his wife. 
To satisfy objection 1\ o. 1, it was agreed that Ray 
Hem1ningway, President and O\vner of Alta Realty and 
Construction Company would guarantee payment on said 
contract, and his signature appears as an obligor thereon 
in evidence of same. 
To satisfy objection No. 2, respondent counsel fur-
nished Mr. Sheffield the telephone number of said Wanda 
Nelson. and ~I r. Sheffield called and talked to her. Se~ 
the testilnony of Appellant concerning these objections 
(TR 118). 
Q. "Well, did your counsel tell you that I gave 
him the telephone number of Wanda Nelson 
in Arizona?" 
A. "No." 
Q. "And that he called personally and talked to 
her,·· 
A. ''He said he had talked to her, yes.·· 
'To satisfy objection No. 3, Fred Aoki, N obuo Aoki 
and their wives all signed the contract, obligating them 
all to pay according to the tern1s therein. See the testi-
Inony of appe1lant (TR 120). 
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Q. ''Well, did your counsel Dean Sheffield tell 
you that I had assured him that all names of 
the four Aokis' would appear on the contract 
if it was of concern to you rather than just 
two~" 
A. "I think he told me that on the phone." 
Security Title was notified of the arrangements made 
by counsel of appellant and respondent counsel, and a 
date was set for closing the transaction on or about the 1st 
day of October, 1957. 
On said day set for closing the transaction, appellant 
appeared with counsel at the office of the Security Title 
Company, Sugarhouse Branch, and examined the docu-
ments. Said papers were not signed at that time inasmuch 
as the original date for closing was September 1st, 1957, 
and all pro-rata figures were adjusted to that date. A 
request was made to change the pro-rata date to N ovem-
ber 1st, inasmuch as it was already October. This request 
was made to respondent's counsel and was accepted and 
agreed. See the testimony of Herbert H. H·alliday, Attor-
ney at Law and :Manager of Security Title Company, 
Sugarhouse Branch (TR 8). 
Q. "Now, you stated that Mrs. Hunt came to 
your office. Did you have any discussions with 
her respecting the buyers or sellers state-
ment?'' 
A. "Yes we did." 
Q. "Would you state what the nature of that 
discussion was and when it took place." 
A. "To the best of my knowledge she came to 
my office with her attorney, Dean Sheffield 
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It was either the last part of September or 
the very first part of October, 1957. All of the 
papers which I had prepared were discussed 
and explained to her by her ·attorney, .Jlr. 
Sheffield. There was, as I recall, one 
main objection for her not signing the papers 
at that time and that was because my papers 
were - my statements were pro-rated on the 
basis of the exchange agreement on Septem-
ber 1st and, of course, it was now about the 
1st of October, and therefore they felt that 
the pro-ration should be changed to the 1st 
of November.'' 
Q. "Was any change made in the pro-ration on 
the statements as a result of that confliction?" 
A. "I did not make any change. I made notations 
of their request that it be changed and in-
fanned them that I would discuss the matter 
with the buyers, and if it was satisfactory 
with the buyers, the changes would be made." 
Q. "Did you so discuss it with the buyers?'~ 
A. "I personally did not discuss it with the buy-
ers. This happened just a day or two before 
I was scheduled to go on a vacation, and be-
cause of that situation, the file was turned 
over to l\fr. Henegar. who "-P..:-: Escrow Officer 
at our Ina in offiee downtown, and he was re-
quested to redraft and redraw the papers to 
show this ne"- pro-ration date. I discussed it 
with the buyers, .Jr r. Quigley. their attorney. 
and he stated X ovetnber 1st pro-ration date 
would he satisfHc.tory. This infor1nation I 
pasRed on to ~rr. Henegar.'" 
'rhe new date for closing the transaction was set 
for October 10, 1957. at the main office of Security Title 
Contpany, and the closing to be handled under the super-
vision of H. D. Henegar, their Escrow Officer. 
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On the lOth day of October, 1957, appellant, with 
her counsel, appeared at the office of Security Title 
Company, at the appointed time, for the purpose of 
closing the transaction. All papers and documents were 
again examined by appellant and her attorney and signed. 
Appellant also, at that tin1e, paid in certain monies re-
quired by the closing papers, which were also examined 
by appellant and counsel and signed. See the cross exam-
ination of H. D. Henegar, Escrow Officer of Security 
Title Company (TR 30). 
Q. "Mr. Henegar, you have just testified that 
Mrs. Hunt, accompanied by her attorney, 
came to your office at the appointed time, 
October lOth to close the transaction 1" 
A. "That is correct." 
Q. "At that time, did Mr. Sheffield again go 
over with Mrs. Hunt all of the papers and 
explain them to her~'' 
A. "He did." 
Q. "And she signed the papers after the explan-
ation to her by her counsel?" 
A. "She did.'' 
And further ( TR 31). 
Q. "Now did Mrs. Hunt at the time she was in 
your office with Mr. Sheffield, after he had 
explained all documents to her, and after she 
had placed her signature upon the docurnents, 
did she voluntarily pay in the money and the 
necessary - if there would be anything else 
necessary to close the transaction f' 
A. "She did." 
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Q. "Was there anything left for Mrs. Hunt to 
do or counsel for Mrs. Hunt other than ex-
~amine the abstract of the property they were 
turning in on the exchange agreement?" 
A. "Nothing". 
The escrow was complete and ready for execution 
as soon as the abstract on the duplex was examined by 
Mr. Sheffield. Mr. Sheffield was given the abstract on 
October 10, and late in the afternoon of October 16, Mr. 
Henegar called 1\Ir. Sheffield and was promised he would 
have it ready the following morning, October 17. The 
morning of the 17th, :Mrs. Hunt appeared at the office 
of the Security Title Company with new counsel, and 
threatened suit if the escrow be distributed. Subsequently, 
Security Title Company placed all documents and monies 
in court in an interpleader action, being under possible 
suit from ,all defendants named in the interpleader action. 
All defendants other than defendant, Eugenia R. 
Hunt, answered and counter-claimed against the plaintiff. 
Defendant, Eugenia H. Hunt, answered and cross-claimed 
against all other defendants. ~\.ll other defendants an-
~wered the eross complaint and eounterelailned. Judge 
Larsen, one of the judges in the lower court, felt that 
affinnative relief for defendants to the cross-cmnplaint, 
should be by affirmatiYe allegations for specific per-
fonnance and not by counter-elaim. The case went to pre-
trial before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson and to trial 
before the Honorable l\Ierrill C. Faux, and specific per-
formance was granted, and execution of the escrow or-
dered. 
10 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1 
THE PRE-TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN REMOVING 
THE CASE FROM THE JURY CALANDER, THOUGH THE 
FEE HAD BEEN PAID, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ERR IN ITS DENIAL OF A JURY MADE AT THE TRIAL-
POINT 2 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 'THE ALTA 
REALTY AND .CONSTRUCTION COMPANY COULD RE-
COVER IN THIS ACTION ON A NOTE REPRESENTING A 
PART OF THE REALTY COMMISSION. 
POINT 3 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE 
APPELLANT OWED $100.00 PER MONTH RENTAL TO THE 
AOKI'S FOR THE USE OF 'THE APARTMENT OCCUPIED 
BY HER, IN ADDITION TO THE RENTALS OF THE OTHER 
APARTMENTS. 
POINT 4 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN rTS F AlLURE TO FIND 
THAT RAY HEMMINGWAY AND FLORENCE 0. YOUNG, 
AGENTS OF ALL THE PARTIES HERE CONCERNED, 
COMMITTED AND PRA·CTICED A CONTINUING FRAUD 
UPON 'THE APPELLAN'l'. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE PRE-TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN REMOVING 
THE CASE FROM THE JURY CALANDER, THOUGH THE 
11 
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FEE HAD BEEN PAID, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ERR IN ITS DENIAL OF A JURY MADE AT THE TRIAL. 
Refer to the pre-trial order (Record file P. 50). 
The Co-urt: "Since the above entitled pre-
trial order was dictated, the court had a discussion 
with counsel and discovered that the case had 
been set for trial and discovered that a demand 
for a jury has been filed and paid for by the de-
fendant, Eugenia R IIunt, and in further discus-
sion with counsel, discovered that counsel was 
willing, for said defendant Hunt, to waive the 
jury, and have the case tried before a judge with 
out jury. Is that correct ~Ir. Huntsman 1" 
Jfr. Hunstrnan: "Yes, that is correct." 
The Court: "It is ordered by the Court that 
the case be set on the 30th day of April at 10:00 
o'clock A.M. for trial, without a jury, and that 
the county clerk refund to Mr. Huntsman the jury 
fee paid." 
The pre-trial was heard and dictated on the 11th 
day of April, 1958. The trial was heard April 30, 1958, 
nineteen days later. Appellant willingly waived a jury 
at said pre-trial, then nineteen days later at the trial, 
requested one. The trial Court properly followed the pre-
trial order, which stated the trial would be without a jury. 
The request for a jury at the trial was not timely 
made, and the refusal of the trial court to entertain a 
demand for a jury at the trial was entirely proper. 
Refer to Utah State Buildh1g and Loan Association 
v. Perkins, 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950, which held, a demand 
12 
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for a jury at the time the case was called for trial came 
too late. 
POINT 2 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE ALTA 
REALTY AND ·CONSTRUCTION COMPANY COULD RE-
COVER IN THIS ACTION ON A NOTE REPRESENTING A 
PART OF THE REALTY COMMISSION. 
The Alta Realty Company was the real estate agent 
in this transaction, and entitled to a 5% real estate com-
mission, as provided under the rules and regulations of 
the Salt Lake Real Estate Board and Multiple Listing 
Bureau, and allowed herein by the listing agreement, 
(Exhibit 13 D) and the exchange agreement, (Exhibit 
1 P). The com1nission allowed in this transaction was 
$1,975.00, being 5% of the sales price of $39,500.00. The 
commission, as evidence in the escrow, was to be paid 
$1,000.00 in cash upon distribution of the escrow, and 
a note (Exhibit 3), for $975.00 also to be distributed 
in the escrow. The note calls for payments of $50.00 per 
month. 
The note was placed in evidence both at the pre-trial 
and the trial \vithout objection. Specific performance 
of the contract and execution of the escrow would ·allow 
delivery of the instrument to said Alta Realty and Con-
struction ·Company. 
The trial in this cause was heard April 30, 1958. At 
its completion, the Honorable Merrill C. Faux took the 
case under advisement. On the 21st day of M·ay, 1958, 
13 
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counsel for all parties to the action were notified that 
the Trial Court was going to decree specific performance, 
and were required to appear before said trial court at 
9 :00 A.M. on the 23rd day of May, 1958, for the purpose 
of suggesting to the Court how the documents and funds 
in the Court should be distributed. The conference was 
held, suggestions were made, and the Court determined 
that since Security Title Company had used November 
1, 1957, as its closing date, that all documents and funds 
be returned to said Security Title Company with instruC-
tions that the escrow be adjusted to the date of July 1, 
1958, but to still use November 1, 1957, as the closing 
date, and the documents and funds distributed through 
the escrow on that basis. 
The commission note was adjusted accordingly, the 
same as all other documents were adjusted. This required 
that the $50.00 monthly payment on said note be adjusted 
through the escrow for payments from the closing date 
of November 1, 1957, to July 1st, 1958. This procedure 
is not collecting payments on a note for the real estate 
commission, as the note itself has never been delivered. 
It is an adjustlnent to the instructions of the escrow by 
the Court, prior to the execution of the escrow. 
Appellant na1ned Alta R.ealty and Construction Com-
pany as a defendant in their cross-complaint, and now 
allege said Cmnpany is not a party to the action. The 
Honorable Martin M. Larsen felt affirmative relief for 
the defendants in the cross complaint, by way of specific 
perfonnance of the contract and execution of the escrow 
was more proper than by wa.y of counterclaim. It follows 
14 
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ho\vever, that specific performance of the contract, and 
execution of the escrow, would result in delivery of the 
adjusted note, to them, whether they be a party to the 
action or not, just the same as the abstractor, the County 
Recorder and others will receive money by virtue of the 
escrow being executed, and they are not parties to the 
action. 
POINT 3 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE 
APPELLANT OWED $100.00 PER MONTH RENTAL TO THE 
AOKI'S FOR THE USE OF 'THE APARTMENT OCCUPIED 
BY HER, IN ADDITION TO THE RENTALS OF THE OTHER 
APARTMENTS. 
The contract herein, (Exhibit 2), upon which spe-
cific performance has been granted is also a document in 
the escrow. Like all other documents in the escrow, it too 
was adjusted to the date of July 1, 1958. Respondents 
herein were entitled to the rentals from the apartments, 
less the cost of the utilities, and appellant was entitled 
to the $300.00 per month payment towards principal and 
interest during the same period. 
The basis to be used in determining the rental values 
of the apartments were discussed at the special meetin~ 
called by the Honorable :Merrill ·C. Faux on the 23rd day 
of Jlay, 1958. It was agreed that the basis to be used 
would be the listing agreement itself. (Exhibit 13 D) 
Appellant under her own signature in said listing agree-
ment placed the rnonthly rental value of her own apart-
ment to be $100.00 per month, and that amount wa~ ac-
cepted. 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT 4 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS F AlLURE TO FIND 
THAT RAY HEMMINGWAY AND FLORENCE 0. YOUNG, 
AGENTS OF ALL THE PARTIES HERE CONCERNED, 
COMMITTED AND PRACTICED A CONTINUING FRAUD 
UPON '~'HE APPELLANT. 
Paragraph 4 of the lower Court's findings, states in 
part, to-wit: "The claim of the Cross Complainant of 
misrepresentations of the exchange agreement, by de-
fendant Alta Realty and Construction Company, was 
insufficient," and Paragraph 3 therein reads as follows, 
to-wit: "That the Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 
October 10, 1958 (Exhibit 2 P herein), is a good valid 
and binding contract, and the said listing agreement of 
J nne 1, 1957, and the said Exchange Agreement of August 
18, 1957, are fully merged therein." 
Mter judgment was entered, appellant made a mo-
tion to the lower Court to amend the findings. The mo-
tion was argued and denied. 
See footnote 46 of Rule 72(a) rtah Code Annotated, 
1954. 
"Supreme Court has full power to review 
·all questions of law and fact in equity eases and 
to set aside trial courts judg1nent if, in opinion 
of Supren1e Court, such judg1nent is not sup-
ported by evidence, but where case was regular-
ly tried, and trial court found on all material 
issues, its findings will not be disturbed by 
Supreme Court, unless they are so manifestly 
erroneous as to demonstrate oversight or mis-
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take which 1naterially affect substantial rights 
of appellant." 
McKay vs. Farr (15-U-261), Klopenstine vs. Hayes 
(20-l'-45)J1)lliu/ vs. ~Vhitmore (23-l'-3-l-2.) 
And further, "in equity cases, unless Supreme Court 
1s convinced that trial Court was clearly wrong in its 
findings, the judgnwnt n1ust stand." Omega Iuvestmcnt 
Co. vs. Walley 72-r-4·~--t 
As to a real estate broker being an agent to both 
buyer and seller, it is not only custmnary, but almost e~­
sential, and the law is well settled on the point. See Aln. 
J ur., Vol. 8, pp. 1012, para. 52. A real estate broker be-
comes an agent of the seller when he t·akes a listing to sell 
a home. When he finds a buyer, and signs him up on an 
Earnest Money Agreement he then becomes the agent of 
the buyer so he can present the buyer's offer back to his 
first principle, the seller. 
In this particular case, the Exchange Agreement, 
(Exhibit P1), <"learly authorizes, in writing, bearing ap-
pellant's signature thereto, the right of Alta Realty to 
act as agent for both appellant and the other respondents. 
Appellant's argument in Point 4 of Appellant's brief 
is typical throughout the case. The starting point is with 
the assumption there was a fraud, which in fact was never 
shown, never found, ·and never existed. 
I refer to Page 12 of appellant's brief, commencing 
with the last paragraph therein. It is true Alta Realty 
would be entitled to a real estate commission. It is true 
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the Aokis' would take possession of the four-plex. How-
ever, it is also true that appellant would receive $300.00 
per month on her contract on the four-plex, and it is 
also true that appellant would receive $1,000.00 ~as a down 
payment, and it is also true that appellant would receive 
a contract on the 2nd South property which sold for 
$10,500.00, and has an unpaid balance of $9,500.00 with 
payment of $80.00 per month thereon at 6% interest. 
The $80.00 per month payment is due to appellant from 
Wanda Nelson, and at the request of appellant's counsel, 
the payment is personally guaranteed by Ray Hemming-
way, owner of .Alta Realty and Construction Company. 
SUMMARY 
The following is respectfully submitted to aid this 
Honorable Court in reaching its decision: 
1. Appellant voluntarily waived a jury at the pre-
trial. 
2. The trial judge tried the case upon a pre-trial 
order which stated it would be tried ·without a jury. 
3. The request of appellant for a jury, at the trial 
was not timely made. 
4. That the AJt.a Realty and Construction Company 
was named as a defendant in the cross-claim of appellant. 
That upon exeeution of the escrow. would be entitled to 
delivery of the note whether a party to the action or not. 
5. That the appellant set the value of her apartment 
in the four-pl0x at $100.00 per 1nonth in the listing agree-
ment, and signed her name thereto. 
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6. That the Court did not find fraud, and upon a 
motion and hearing to amend the findings, the court re-
iterated there was no finding of fraud. 
7. That appellant was with competent counsel for 
two months between the signing of the exchange agree-
ment and the final contract. 
8. That appellant was with competent counsel each 
time she appeared at Security Title Company for the 
purpose of exmnining and signing the final papers, and 
was with competent counsel at the time she actually 
signed her name to the docmnents and paid the necessary 
money into the escrow. 
9. That at no place in the pleadings, or the trial, 
did appellant attempt to set out the elements of a fraud, 
although given every opportunity to do so. The entire ac-
cusations are by words of fraud, deceit, misrepresenta-
tion, etc., without £acts or evidence to substantiate the 
claim. 
10. That respondents named in the action were n'Ot 
even requested to attend the trial or be examined. That 
appellant's case rests solely upon her own testimony and 
even that is backed only by accusations without support-
ing facts or evidence. 
WILLIAM C. QUIGLEY 
Attorney for Respondents 
1045 East 21st South, Suite 
No.2, Salt Lake City. Utah 
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